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Abstract: In this paper we discuss some reasons why temporal logic might not be suitable to
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1 Introduction
The aim of this note is to discuss the reasons why temporal logic, speciVcally Linear Temporal
Logic [7] might not be suitable to check whether the speciVcations of a system comply with a
set of normative requirements.
The debate whether it is possible to use temporal logic for the representation of norms
is not a novel one (see for example [9]), and while the argument had settled for a while,
the past decade saw a resurgence of the topic with many works in the Velds of normative
multi-agents and business process compliance advocating temporal logic as the formalism to
express normative constraints on agent behaviours and process executions. One of the reasons
behind this could be the success of model checking for temporal logic in verifying large scale
industry applications1.
The problem in normative multi-agents systems and business process compliance is to
determine whether the actions an agent is going to perform (encoded as a plan, corresponding
to a sequence of actions) or the tasks to be executed by a business process conform with a
set of normative constraints regulating their possible (legal) behaviours. In both cases we
have sequences of actions/tasks leading to sequences of states and constrains over what states
and sequences of states are deemed legal according to a set of normative constrains. From a
formal point of view both the behaviours and the constraints are represented by temporal logic
formulas and an agent or process are compliant if the set of formulas is consistent. Temporal
logic is deVnitely capable to model the sequences of states corresponding the behaviours of
agents and processes, but the issue whether it is able to represents normative constraints (i.e.,
obligations and prohibition) in a conceptually sound way has been neglected. We believe that
this is crucial issue to be addressed before these techniques can be proposed for practical real
life cases. Without a positive answer the work based on temporal logic for the representation
of norms remains a futile formal exercise.
The short discussion above boils down to the following question:
Are normative constrains (i.e., obligations and prohibitions) regulating the be-
haviours of their subjects diUerent from other types of constraints?
In case of a negative answer we have to identify what are the diUerences, and how to model
them in temporal logic. Furthermore, we have to identify what are the issues with the resulting
modelling.
Obligations and prohibitions are constraints that limit the scope of actions of the bearer
subject to them. However, there is a very important diUerence between obligations and prohi-
bitions and other types of constraints: violations do not result in inconsistencies. This means
that they can be violated without breaking the systems in which they appear. Accordingly,
a better understanding of obligations and prohibitions is that they deVne what is legal (in a
particular system) and what is illegal. Based on this reading a violation simply indicates that
we ended up in an illegal situation or state. A further aspect we have to consider, and that
has been by large neglected by investigations on how to formalise and reason with deontic
concepts, is that violations can be compensated for, and a situation where there is a violation
1The fathers of model checking for temporal logic, i.e., Edmund Clarke, E. Allen Emerson and Joseph Sifakis,
were the recipient of the Turing award in 2007 for their role in developing Model-Checking into a highly eUective
veriVcation technology that is widely adopted in the hardware and software industries.
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but there is a compensation for the violation is still deemed legal (even if, from a legal point of
view, less ideal than the situation where the violation does not occur).
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section we introduce a legal scenario (a
fragment of an hypothetical privacy act) illustrating some of the aspects diUerentiating norms
form other types of constraints, and we shortly discuss what the outcomes of cases related to
this scenario should be. Then in Section 3 we brieWy recall the basics of Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL). In Section 4 we discuss how to formalise the scenario in LTL. We point out various
shortcomings for the representation of norms in LTL, and we show that LTL captures only
some of the aspects of the scenario (suggesting that it is not able to model real life norms), or it
leads to paradoxical results.2
2 Legal Motivation
Suppose that a Privacy Act contains the following norms:3
Section 1. The collection of personal information is forbidden, unless acting on a court order
authorising it.
Section 2. The destruction of illegally collected personal information before accessing it is a
defence against the illegal collection of the personal information.
Section 3. The collection of medical information is forbidden, unless the entity collecting the
medical information is permitted to collect personal information.
In addition the Act speciVes what personal information and medical information are, and they
turn out to be disjoint.
Suppose an entity, subject to the Act, collects some personal information without being
permitted to do so; at the same time they collect medical information. The entity recognises
that they illegally collected personal information (i.e., they collected the information without
being authorised to do so by a Court Order) and decides to remediate the illegal collection
by destroying the information before accessing it. Is the entity compliant with the Privacy
Act above? Given that the personal information was destroyed the entity was excused from
the violation of the Vrst section (illegal collection of personal information). However, even if
the entity was excused from the illegal collection, they were never entitled (i.e., permitted)
to collect personal information4, consequently they were not permitted to collect medical
information; thus the prohibition of collecting medical information was in force. Accordingly,
the collection of medical information violates the norm forbidding such an activity.
Let us examine the structure of the act:
Section 1 establishes two conditions:
i. Typically the collection of personal information is forbidden; and
2Following Åqvist’s [10] presentation, a paradox arises in a deontic logic ∆ either when there is a formula φ
derivable in ∆ but for which the translation does not seem derivable within the natural normative language, or
there is a formula φ which is not derivable in ∆ but for which the translation seems derivable within our natural
normative language.
3The Privacy Act presented here, though realistic, is a Vctional one. However, (i) it is based on the novel
Australian Privacy Principles (APP), Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, and (ii)
sections with the same logical structure as the clauses of this Vctional act are present in the APP Act.
4If they were permitted to collect personal information, then the collection would have not been illegal, and
they did not have to destroy it.
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ii. The collection of personal information is permitted, if there is a court order authorizing
the collection of personal information.
Section 2 can be paraphrased as follows:
iii. The destruction of personal information collected illegally before accessing it excuses
the illegal collection.
Similarly to Section 2, Section 3 states two conditions:
iv. Typically the collection of medical information is forbidden; and
v. The collection of medical information is permitted provided that the collection of per-
sonal information is permitted.
Based on the above discussion, if we abstract from the actual content of the norms, the structure
of the act can be represented by the following set of norms (extended form):
E1. A is forbidden.
E2. A is permitted givenC (alternatively: ifC, then A is permitted).
E3. The violation of A is compensated by B
E4. D is forbidden.
E5. If A is permitted, so is D.
To compensate a violation we have to have a violation the compensation compensates. More-
over, to have a violation we have to have an obligation or prohibition, the violation violates.
Accordingly, it makes sense to combine E1 and E3 in a single norm, obtaining thus the following
set of norms (condensed form):
C1. A is forbidden; its violation is compensated by B.
C2. A is permitted givenC (alternatively: ifC, then A is permitted).
C3. D is forbidden.
C4. If A is permitted, so is D.
Based on the discussion so far the logical structure of the act is (logical form):
L1. ForbiddenA; if ForbiddenA and A, then ObligatoryB.
L2. ifC, then PermittedA.
L3. ForbiddenD.
L4. If PermittedA, then PermittedD.
Notice the way we modelled the violation of the prohibition of A in L1, namely as the conjunc-
tion of A and the prohibition of A.5 Then we model that B is the compensation of the violation
of A as an implication from the violation of A to the obligation of B.
Let us consider what are the situations compliant with the above set of norms. Clearly,
if C does not hold, then we have that the prohibition of A and prohibition of D are in force.
Therefore, a situation where ¬A, ¬C, and ¬D hold is fully compliant (irrespective whether
B holds or not). If C holds, then the permission of A derogates the prohibition of A, thus
situations with either A holds or ¬A holds are compliant with the Vrst two norms; in addition,
the permission of A allows us to derogate the prohibition of D. Accordingly, situations with
either D or ¬D comply with the third norm. Let us go back to scenarios whereC does not hold,
and let us suppose that we have A. This means that the prohibition of A has been violated;
5Similarly, the violation of the obligation of A is the conjunction of obligation A and the negation of the
content of the obligation, that is, ¬A.
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nevertheless the set of norms allows us to recover from such a violation by B. However, as we
just remarked above to have a violation we have to have either an obligation or a prohibition
that has been violated: in this case the prohibition of A. Given that the prohibition of A and the
permission of A are mutually incompatible, we must have, to maintain a consistent situation,
that A is not permitted. But if Awas not permittedD is not permitted either; actually, according
to the third norm, D is forbidden. To sum up, a scenario where ¬C, A, B and ¬D hold is still
compliant (even if to a lesser degree given the compensated violation of the prohibition of A).
In any case, no situation where both ¬C and D hold is compliant.
Table 1 summarises the compliant and not compliant situations. We only report the minimal
sets required to identify whether a situation is compliant or not. For non-minimal sets the
outcome is determined by the union of the status for the minimal subsets.
Minimal Set Compliance Status
C compliant
¬C, A, B weakly compliant: compensated violation of the prohibition of A
¬C, A, ¬B not compliant: uncompensated violation of the prohibition of A
¬C, D not compliant: violation of prohibition of D
¬C, ¬A, ¬D compliant
Table 1: Compliance Status for the Privacy Act
3 Logic Background
Linear Temporal Logic [7] is equipped with three unary temporal operators:
• Xφ : next φ (φ holds at the next time);
• Fφ : eventually φ (φ holds sometimes in the future); and
• Gφ : globally φ (φ always holds in the future).
In addition we have the following binary operators:
• φ Uψ : φ until ψ (φ holds until ψ holds);
• φWψ : φ weak until ψ (φ holds until ψ holds and ψ might not hold).
The operators above are related by the following equivalences establishing some interdeVnabil-
ity among them:
• Fφ ≡>Uφ ,
• Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ ,
• φWψ ≡ (φ Uψ)∨Gφ .
The semantics of LTL can be given in terms of transition systems. A transition system TS is a
structure
(1) TS= 〈S,R,v〉
where
• S is a (non empty) set of states
• R⊆ S×S such that ∀s ∈ S∃t ∈ S : (s, t) ∈ R
• v is a valuation function v : S 7→ 2Prop
NICTA Technical Report TR-8026 7
where Prop is the set of atomic propositions.
Formulas in LTL are evaluated against fullpaths (also called traces or runs). A fullpath is a
sequence of states in S connected by the transition relation R. Accordingly, σ = s0,s1,s2 . . .
is a fullpath if and only if (si,si+1) ∈ R. Given a fullpath σ , σi denotes the subsequence of σ
starting from the i-th element, and σ [i] denotes the i-th element of σ .
Equipped with the deVnitions above, the valuation conditions for the various temporal
operators are:
• TS,σ  p (p ∈ Prop) iU p ∈ v(σ [0]);
• TS,σ  ¬φ iU TS,σ 6 φ ;
• TS,σ  φ ∧ψ iU TS,σ  φ and TS,σ  ψ ;
• TS,σ  Xφ iU TS,σ1  φ ;
• TS,σ  φ Uψ iU ∃k : k ≥ 0, TS,σk  ψ and ∀ j : 0≤ j < k, TS,σ j  φ ;
• TS,σ  Gφ iU ∀k ≥ 0, TS,σk  φ ;
• TS,σ  Fφ iU ∃k ≥ 0, TS,σk  φ .
A formula φ is true in a fullpath σ iU it is true at the Vrst element of the fullpath. Next we
deVne what it means for a formula φ to be true in a state s ∈ S (TS,s  φ ).
(2) TS,s  φ iU ∀σ : σ [0] = s, TS,σ  φ .
4 Scenario Formalised
The Vrst problem we have to address is how to model obligations and permissions in Linear
Temporal Logic. When one considers the temporal lifecycle obligations, obligations can be
classiVed as achievement and maintenance obligations [4]. After an obligation enters into
force, the obligation remains in force for an interval of time. A maintenance obligation is an
obligation whose content must hold for every instant in the interval in which the obligation
is in force. On the other hand, for an achievement obligation, the content of the obligation
has to hold at least once in the interval of validity of the obligation. Accordingly, a possible
solution is to use G to model maintenance obligations6 and F for achievement obligations.
A drawback of this proposal is that G and F are the dual of each other, i.e., Gα ≡ ¬F¬α . In
Deontic Logic permission is typically deVned as the lack of the obligation to the contrary and
the deontic operators O and P to model obligations and permissions are deVned to be the dual
of each other, namely Oα ≡ ¬P¬α . In addition, most deontic logics assume the following
axiom (Axiom D)7
(3) Oα → Pα
to ensure consistency of sets of norms. The axiom is equivalent to Oα →¬O¬α meaning
that if α is obligatory, then its opposite (¬α) is not. Prohibitions can modelled as negative
obligations, thus α is forbidden if its opposite is obligatory, that is O¬α . Furthermore, it has
been argued that maintenance obligations are suitable to model prohibitions.
Based on the discussion above, considering that the normative constraints in the scenario
of Section 2 are actually prohibitions, we formalise the scenario using G for maintenance
6We can use U instead of G to capture that an obligation is in force in an interval.
7In terms of Kripke possible world semantics Axiom D is characterised by seriality, i.e., ∀x∃y(xRy), and this is
the property imposed on the transition relation R over the set of states S in a transition system for LTL.
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obligations (actually prohibitions) and F for permissions. We temporarily suspend judgement
whether using an operator suitable to model achievement obligations to model the dual
permission for maintenance obligation is appropriate or not. All we remark here is that any
formalism meant to model real life norms should account for both obligations and permissions
as Vrst class citizens.
A Vrst possible prima facie formalisation of the conditions set out in the Privacy Act is:
1. G¬A, (G¬A∧A)→ GB;
2. C→ FA;
3. G¬D;
4. FA→ FD.
The set of formulas above exhibits some problems. First of all, in a situation where we haveC
we get a contradiction from 1. and 2., i.e., G¬A and FA, and then a second from 3., and 2. and
4., namely G¬D and FD. This is due to the fact that normative reasoning is defeasible. Shortly
and roughly a conclusion can be asserted unless there are reasons against it. In addition, to get
the expected results, we have to consider that the scenario uses strong permissions, where the
permissions derogates the obligations to the contrary, or, in other terms, that the permissions
are exceptions to the obligations. To accomplish this we have to specify that 2. overrides 1.,
and 4. overrides 3. Technically, the overrides relationship can be achieved using the following
procedure:8
1. rewrite the formulas involved as conditionals. Thus G¬A can be rewritten as >→ G¬A.
2. add the negation of the antecedent of the overriding formulas to the antecedent of the
formulas overridden formula. Accordingly >→ G¬A is transformed into ¬C→ G¬A.9
The second aspect we concentrate on is the form of the formulas in 1., in particular on the
expression
(4) (G¬A∧A)→ GB.
To start with they bear resemblance with the so called contrary-to-duty obligations. A contrary-
to-duty obligation states that an obligation/prohibition is in force when the opposite of an
obligation/prohibition holds. The template for contrary-to-duty obligations is given by the pair
(a) Oα and (b) ¬α → Oβ . Contrary-to-duty obligations are typically problematic for deontic
logic and the source of inspiration for a wealth of research in the Veld (see [8, 3]). The formula
under scrutiny is indeed related, but there is a diUerence: it explicitly requires a violation,
while the structure in (b) does not. In the context of the Privacy Act scenario (b) would mean
that an entity has the obligation to destroy collected personal information without accessing
simply because they collected it (even in the case the collection was legal, or even when they
had the mandate to collect it and eventually preserve it).
Accordingly, we introduce the class of compensatory (contrary-to-duty) obligations. A
compensatory obligation states that an obligation/prohibition is in force as the result of the
violation of another obligation/prohibition. Thus the obligation triggered in response to the
violation (secondary obligation) compensates the violation of the violated obligation (primary
8The focus of this paper is not how to implement defeasibility or non-monotonicity in LTL or in another
monotonic logic, thus we just exemplify a possible procedure.
9A side-eUect of this procedure, which is harmless for the purpose of this paper, is that now the combination
of 3. and 4. makes FA and FD equivalent, namely FA≡ FD.
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obligation). In other words a situation where the primary obligation is violated, but the
secondary obligation is fulVlled is still deemed legal, even if it is less ideal than the case
where the primary obligation is fulVlled.10 The language employed in the Privacy Act suggests
that that the conditions stated in Section 1 and Section 2 of the Act correspond to a case of
compensatory obligation.
We turn now our attention to the issue of how to formalise compensatory obligations in
LTL. The Vrst concern we have when we look at 4 we notice that its antecedent is always false,
i.e., G¬A∧A≡⊥, since G¬A implies that A is false in all worlds following the world where the
formula is evaluated including that world, but at the same time A is required to be true at that
world. The second issue is that the compensation is assumed to be a maintenance obligation
while the textual provision suggests it is a achievement obligation. We shortly discuss that
achievement obligation should be represented by F, but F is used to model permissions.
To avoid the issues just discussed we introduce a new binary (temporal) operator ⊗ for
compensatory obligations11. What we have to do for this end is to identify the conditions
under which a maintenance obligation is violated. The maintenance obligation Oα is violated
if there is a instant in the interval of validity of the obligation where α does not hold, namely
¬α holds. The second thing is to deVne what it means to compensate a violation. Suppose
that we are told that the violation of α is compensated by β . A natural intuition for this is that
there is an instant in the interval of validity of Oα where ¬α holds, and there is an instant
successive to the violation where the course of action described by β holds. Based on the
intuition just described LTL seems well suited to this task. Here is the evaluation condition for
⊗:12,13
(5) TS,σ  φ ⊗ψ iU ∀i≥ 0, TS,σi  φ ; or ∃ j,k : 0≤ j ≤ k, TS,σ j  ¬φ and TS,σk  ψ.
We are now ready to provide the formalisation of the Privacy Act.
N1. ¬C→ (¬A⊗B);
N2. C→ FA;
N3. G¬A→ G¬D;
N4. FA→ FD.
Transition systems can be use to model runs of systems, possible ways in which business
processes can be executed, the actions of an agents or more in general the dynamic evolution
of a system or the world. Norms are meant to regulate the behaviour of systems, how
organisations run their business, the actions of agents and so on. So, how do we check if a
particular course of actions (modelled by a transition system) complies with a set of norms
(where the norms are formalised in LTL)? Simply, if the transition system is a model for the set
of formulas representing the norms.
10We do not exclude the case that there are situations where norms have the form of what we call compensatory
obligations, but where the obligation in response to the violation does not (legally) compensate the violation.
11The idea of using a speciVc operator for compensatory (contrary-to-duty) obligations is presented in [5].
12Again the focus of the paper is not on how to properly model compensatory (contrary-to-duty) obligations.
The operator presented here does its job in the context of the paper. For alternative deVnitions in the context of
temporal logic or inspired by temporal logic see [6, 1]. For a semantic approach not based on temporal logic see
[2].
13This condition implements compensatory obligations when the primary obligation is a maintenance obli-
gation and the secondary obligation is an achievement obligation. Similar deVnitions can be given for other
combinations of primary and secondary obligations.
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Consider a transition system TS= 〈S,R,v〉 where
1. S= {ti : i ∈ N},
2. R= {(ti, ti+1) : i ∈ N},
3. ¬C ∈ v(ti) for all i ∈ N, A ∈ v(t1), D ∈ v(t1) and B ∈ v(t2).
The transition system is such that
(6) TS, ti  ¬C, TS, t1  A, TS, t1  D, TS, t2  B.
This transition system implements the scenario where at no time there is a Court Order
authorising the collection of personal information (¬C for all ti), an entity collects personal
information (A at time t1) and successively destroys it (B at time t2), and at the same time when
personal information was collected medical information was collected (D at time t1).
It is immediate to verify that the transition system TS is a model of N1–N4, namely:
(7) ∀t ∈ S : TS, t  N1∧N2∧N3∧N4.
Accordingly, TS is compliant with N1–N4. However, there is state t1 where both ¬C and D
hold. In Section 2 we argued that a situation where ¬C and D both hold is not compliant.
Therefore, we have a paradox, the formalisation indicates that the scenario is compliant, the
course of actions described by the transition system does not result in a contradiction, so
no illegal action is performed (or better, the collection of personal information is illegal, but
its compensation, destruction of the personal information, makes full amends to it), but our
legal intuition suggests that the collection of medical information in the circumstances of the
scenario is illegal.14
5 Conclusion
The contribution of this note is twofold. First we presented a novel paradox for Deontic Logic
inspired by real life norms. In particular the logical structures used in the paradox appear
frequently in real life (legal) norms. The second contribution was a short analysis of how to
represent norms in Linear Temporal Logic, and that the proposed formalisation results in a
paradox, showing that LTL might not be suitable to model norms and legal reasoning.
We would like to point out that the discussion in the previous section just shows that a
particular formalisation based on LTL is not suitable to represent the scenario, not that LTL
per se is not able to represent the scenario. Indeed one could create all possible full paths
in a transition system not breaching the norms, and then using the paths to synthesise the
norms that regulate the transition system. However, we believe that such ex post analysis
is useless. First humans have to perform the reasoning to determine which norms hold
and when and then which paths violate the norms. In addition the strength of LTL is the
ability to verify speciVcations against transition systems. But in such a case, given that the
14We run a pseudo empirical validation of the scenario by proposing the scenario and the Privacy Act to about
a dozen legal professionals ranging from corporate legal councillors, to high court judges to law professors. They
all agree without any hesitation that the collection of medical information under the circumstances described
by the scenario is illegal. However, a true validation can be only given either by a law court adjudication of a
case where the norms at hand are isomorphic to the Privacy Act, or by any body with the power to give a true
interpretation of an act isomorphic to the act we proposed for the scenario.
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speciVcations are derived from the transition systems, the veriVcation is always positive and
totally uninformative. Furthermore, we believe that the formalisation we proposed, while naive,
is extremely intuitive. The major objection, as we remarked in Section 2, is that permissions
are modelled using F, and we hinted that F might be suitable to model achievement obligation,
and using a particular type of obligation to model permissions is not appropriate and counter-
intuitive outcomes are to be expected. We fully agree with this objection, but if we agree
that a permission is the lack of an obligation to the contrary, then F is the natural choice for
permissions for prohibition (maintenance obligations). The other issue is that if we do not
use F, the issue is how to model permission, and the alternative is that LTL does not support
permissions. The act we presented clearly shows that there are acts where permissions must
be represented and that permissions play an important role in determining which obligations
are in force and when they are in force. Hence, any formalisation excluding permission is
doomed to be unable to represent the vast majority of real life legal norms.
The Vnal remark we want to make is that the paradox is not restricted to LTL. It can be
easily replicated in Standard Deontic Logic (and it is well know that Standard Deontic Logic is
plagued with many other contrary-to-duty paradoxes). A root-cause analysis of the paradox is
that a violation of a compensable obligation results in a sub-ideal state. Hence, there is a state
with a violation that is still deemed legal. This means, that there is a (somehow) legal state,
and if permission is evaluated as being in at least one legal state, then the violation has to be
evaluated as (somehow) permitted. Part of the problem is that in such somehow legal states
there might be other true legitimate permissions which are not the violation of compensable
obligations. Accordingly, we conjecture, that logics using truth of a formula in at least one
(somehow) legal state to determine whether something is permitted have counterparts of the
paradox we presented. However, a careful analysis of existing deontic logics is needed to
evaluate if they are actually aUected by the paradox.
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